CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGESTS
By: A.J. Gomez [May 14, 2021]
(1) Title of the Case: Denmark Valmores vs. Dra. Cristina Achacoso
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R. No. 217453, July 19, 2017 (Religious Freedom)
Facts:
Petitioner Denmark S. Valmores (Valmores), a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a sacred day. Petitioner Valmores was unable to take his Histo-Pathology laboratory examination held on September 13, 2015, a Saturday. Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was given by either of the respondents. As a result, petitioner Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that particular module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.
Dr. Macapado Abaton Muslim (Dr. Muslim), President of MSU, instructed respondent Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum. Despite the foregoing correspondence, petitioner Valmores' request still went unheeded.
Issue:
Whether mandamus lies to compel respondents to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum.
Ruling: YES.
The enforcement of the 2010 CHED Memorandum is compellable by writ of mandamus.
The Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the freedom to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to protect the rights of others and in the interest of public welfare.
In the 2010 CHED Memorandum, the CHED laid down guidelines for the exemption of teachers, personnel, and students from participating in school or related activities due to compliance with religious obligations.
Its policy is crystal clear: a student's religious obligations takes precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious obligations.
That petitioner is being made to choose between honoring his religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his religious freedoms. As the final bulwark of fundamental rights, the Court will not allow such violation to perpetuate any further.
As representatives of the State, educational institutions are bound to safeguard the religious freedom of their students.
Thus, our schools carry the responsibility to restrict its own academic liberties, should they collide with constitutionally preferred rights.
Petition GRANTED.
(2) Title of the Case: Cesar Yatco vs. Bel-Air
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R. No. 211780, November 21, 2018 (Right to Association)
Facts:
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (Association), Bel-Air Village's homeowners' association, was constituted as a non-stock, non-profit association to promote its members' best interests. Under its by-laws, all lot owners of Bel-Air Village automatically became members of the Association.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners Cezar Yatco Real Estate Services, et. al.,
can be compelled to maintain their membership with respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. under its bylaws.
Ruling: YES.
In the case of Tanchoco v. Aquino, (154 SCRA 1[1987]), the Court ruled that purchasers of a registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. . .
When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all encumbrances except notations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association.
Bel Air Village Association, Inc. also underscored that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association can only be invoked against the State, and does not apply to private transactions, like a sale, where a condition was validly imposed by the vendor. [CONTRACT OF SALE ITO EH, PRIVATE CONTRACT]
PADCOM Condominium Corporation v. Ortigas Center Association, Inc. reiterated that automatic membership in a homeowners' association does not violate lot owners' right to freedom of association because they were not forced to buy their lots from the developer:
Petition DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
(3) Title of the Case: Davao City Water District vs. Aranjuez, (Freedom of Expression)
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R. 194192, June 16, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Davao City Water District(DCWD) is a government-owned and controlled corporation in Davao City represented by its General Manager Engr. Rodora N. Gamboa (GM Gamboa). The private respondents, Rodrigo L. Aranjuez, Gregorio S., et. al., are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao City Water District (NAMADACWAD).
Came the anniversary, officers and members sported t-shirts with inscriptions "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!" at the beginning of the Fun Run at VictoriaPlaza at around 6:30 in the morning and continued to wear the same inside the premises of the DCWD office during the office hours.
They were charged with several administrative cases due to acts committed during the anniversary celebration of DCWD.
CSC ruled in favor of respondents. CA affirmed in toto CSC Resolution.
Issue:
WoN the concerted mass action of respondents violates CSC Resolution No. 021316.
Ruling: NO.
The operative phrases are "any collective activity" and "work stoppage or service disruption."
Without the intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the concerted activity is not prohibited. The time and place of the activity are not determinative of the prohibition. Whether done within government hours, a concerted activity is allowed if it is without any intent at work stoppage.
Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed, and required, to wear. Else, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
In simple paraphrase we say, regulation of the freedom of expression is not removal of the constitutional right.
Petition DENIED. Nonetheless, the CSC Decision which was affirmed in toto by the CA is MODIFIED.
(4) Title of the Case: Marcelo Saluday vs. People (Right to Privacy)
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R. 215305, April 3, 2018,
Facts:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to open the bag. The bag revealed firearms and explosives. Unable to show any authority, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco. The Prosecutor of Davao City found probable cause for violation of PD 1866. RTC declared petitioner to be in actual or constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority or license. CA DISMISSED the appeal.
Issue:
WoN the right of the petitioner to privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures were violated
Ruling: NO.
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy.
The bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.
Also, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered "yes, just open it" based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search of the contents of his bag.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. The Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their tenninals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.
Petition DENIED. CA Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
(5) Title of the Case: People vs. Lino Alejandro (Double Jeopardy)
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R. 223099, February 11, 2018
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape, defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 83693, of a 12-year old minor, AAA.
The RTC acquitted the accused-appellant. On the same day, however, the RTC recalled and set aside its decision. Motion for reconsideration on account of double jeopardy was denied. The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the RTC's Order
was justified.
Issue:
WoN the accused-appellant's right against double jeopardy was violated.
Ruling: YES.
In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.
Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.
Also, exceptions of right against double jeopardy do not exist in this case.
Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial.
A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.
The inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
Appeal GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
(6) Title of the Case: Chiok vs. People (Double Jeopardy)
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R. No. 179814, December 7, 2015
Facts:
Chiok was charged with estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Chiok denied the allegations.
The RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa (RTC conviction). Chiok's motion for reconsideration was denied.
On appeal, the CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's evidence but merely recited the evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of the ultimate facts constituting estafa. Simply put, the prosecution was not able to prove the element of misappropriation (i.e., deviation from Chua's instructions).
Issue:
WoN the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of double jeopardy.
Ruling: NO.
The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.
Rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule.
At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal.
The Court also did not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.
The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan is starkly different from this case.
Purported errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence which cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Certainly, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed where both parties had the opportunity to present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from which its decision is based, as in this case.
The petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Chua failed to do so.
Petition DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari GRANTED. CA Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
CA’S ACQUITTAL BECOMES FINAL, NOT JUST ONLY ON THE RTC ACQUITTAL. ANY APPEAL ON THAT CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
(7) Title of the Case: Jeffrey Miguel vs. People (Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure)
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R. 227308, July 31, 2017
Facts:
Upon responding on a report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street. Petitioner was brought to the police station for having seized in his possession
two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves, which was later confirmed and that petitioner was positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites, both dangerous drugs.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different version of the facts.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.
Issue:
WoN the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Ruling: NO.
The Bill of Rights may be applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives because such individuals act under the color of a state-related function.
However, in warrantless arrest, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential. Verily, the prosecution's claim that petitioner was showing off his private parts was belied by the aforesaid testimonies. Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was no overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner. Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of such search is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Petition GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
(8) Title of the Case: People vs. Jaime Sison (Unreasonable Search)
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019
Facts:
The Municipal Police Station of M'lang, North Cotabato received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police instructed to set up a checkpoint. The tipped vehicle was found to have two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine.The vehicle, its driver, and its passengers were brought to the local police station. The driver and the two (2) passengers were later identified as Sison, Bautista, and Yanson, respectively. An Information was filed against Sison, Yanson, and Bautista RTC Cotabato City, charging them with violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
RTC convicted the accused. CA denied the appeal.
Issue:
WoN a valid search and seizure was conducted.
Ruling: NO
The finding of probable cause must be premised on more than just the initial information relayed by assets. It was the confluence of initial tips and a myriad of other occurrences that ultimately sustained probable cause.
Here, the police officers relied solely on the radio message they received when they proceeded to inspect the vehicle. Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of probable cause.
It cannot be said that Sison, the driver, consented to the search made by the arresting officers. Jurisprudence has settled that "[m]ere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all." Here, Sison, was under the coercive force of armed law enforcers. His consent, if at all, was clearly vitiated.
Thus, here, the arresting officers' search and subsequent seizure are invalid. As such, the two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly being transported in the pickup cannot be admitted in evidence.
Even assuming that they were admissible, there remains no proof, whether direct or circumstantial, that the accused actually knew that there were drugs under the hood of their vehicle. Ultimately, their actual authorship of or conscious engagement in the illegal activity of transporting dangerous drugs could not be ascertained.
CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
(9) Title of the Case: People vs. Amador Pastrana (Unreasonable Search)
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R No. 196045, February 21, 2108
Facts:
On the basis of received confidential information, NBI Special Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) was able to secure a search warrant from RTC Makati to search the office premises of respondents Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Makati City. Respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant.
When the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58. it ruled that the search warrant was null and void. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
WoN NBI Agent Gaerlan’s search warrant was valid.
Ruling: NO.
In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."
First, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. Hence, it is imperative to specify what particular provision of the SRC was violated.
Second, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the license to operate as brokers or dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the view that at the time of the application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary as to what offense to charge respondents with.
Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined with each other that the issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the one-specific-offense rule, the two offenses are entirely different from each other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other.
Moreover, The terms used in this warrant were too all-embracing,
In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one offense and for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure.
Petition DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
(10) Title of the Case: Jesus Nicardo Falcis, III vs. Civil Registrar General (Equal Protection Clause) (Right to Marry)
G.R. No. and date of promulgation: G.R. No. 21790, September 3, 2019
Facts:
Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before the Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to "declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4)2 and 55(6)3 of the Family Code,” claiming that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code deny the existence of "individuals belonging to religious denominations that believe in same-sex marriage" and that they have a "right to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions."
Issues:
WoN denying same-sex couples the right to marry amounts to a denial of their right to lifeand/or liberty without due process of law;
WoN limiting civil marriages to opposite-sex couples violates the equal protection clause;
Ruling:
NO. Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself must create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal framework.
Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more inclusive and egalitarian arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Prematurely adjudicating issues in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It may unwittingly diminish the LGBTQI+ community’s capacity to create a strong movement that ensures lasting recognition, as well as public understanding, of SOGIESC.
NO. Petitioner argues that there is no substantial distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples.
However, petitioner miserably failed to discharge even the most elementary burden to demonstrate that the relief he prays for is within this Court's power to grant. Petitioner did not present to the Court any other provision of law that will be affected as a consequence of his Petition.
Petitioner has neither suffered any direct personal injury nor shown that he is in danger of suffering any injury from the present implementation of the Family Code. He has neither an actual case nor legal standing.
Petition DISMISSED.
